Reaction to China’s proposed anti-secession law has been understandably strong in Taiwan. Although the law has not been officially concluded yet, and the texts of drafts are only just starting to appear, everyone knew well in advance the basic substance. After some waffle about Taiwan being an inseperable part of China, and how everyone wants things to resolved in an amicable manner, the meat of the law is here:

8. If Taiwan splittist forces, under any pretense, using any method, cause the actuality of Taiwan splitting out of China, or if a major incident that will lead to Taiwan splitting out of China happens, or if the conditions for peaceful reunification are completely lost, the country should take non-peaceful methods and other necessary means and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

Of course, what is meant by the ‘actuality of Taiwan splitting out of China’ is open to interpretation: presumably the president of Taiwan saying that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state doesn’t count, but the Taiwanese government passing a law to that effect might. None the less the message is pretty clear.

Ignoring the more hardcore responses, like changing the constitution, or a referendum on independence (which wouldn’t have a chance of passing, even if they were sensible) – it’s worth looking at what the reaction in Taiwan is likely to be.

The most obvious response is a ‘tit-for-tat’ anti anti-secession law which would define Taiwans response to any ‘non-peaceful’ actions by China. Of course, this law would be even more of a symbolic jesture than China’s law: if it ever gets to that state, noone’s going to be worrying about the legality of it all. The subtext would be a restatement of the position that Taiwan is not controlled by the PRC, and so can pass whatever laws it likes too. However, the odds are that the different parties in the legislature will have trouble agreeing the substance and wording of any law, which could scupper that idea.

A more likely response is to reconsider the long-argued-over weapons purchases from the US. The legislature has been stuck for several months over a proposed budget of NT$610 billion (~US$20billion) for a special arms purchase package (with the KMT arguing for a reduced amount – despite the fact that they were the ones who originally brokered the deal); this law by China might just be the stimulus needed to get the package agreed upon.

However, the most likely response is more a question of what Taiwan won’t do. In the last couple of months, President Chen Shui Bian has shown an increased willingness to negotiate with the other side; he hasn’t actually changed his position, but his recent deal with the pro-unification PFP implies a softening of his stance. He has always wanted to restart talks with China, and it looked like he was maneuvering himself into a position which might make that possible. To do it, he would need the cooperation of the PFP, but also the support of his own party – which was already a bit shaky recently. The odds again him getting that support have just increased massively.

The fact that China have decided to pass this law now, when Taiwan have been making more concilliatory noises than at any time in the last ten years (which, granted, is not saying much), implies that China are not really too concerned about the lack of talks between the two sides.

(Thoughts about the anti-secession law can also be found at Naruwan Formosa)

It’s nearly a year since Chen Shui Bian was shot (March 19th 2004, the day before the election), and most people have given up on the case ever being solved. However, there was a press conference today, where a prime suspect was finally announced.

Investigators said Monday they’ve identified the “most likely suspect” who fired a shot that slightly injured Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian one day before he was narrowly re-elected last March.

But the suspect, Chen Yi-hsiung, drowned shortly after the March 19 shooting and police thought it was a suicide because the man prepared a will just before his death, said Hou You-yi, head of the Criminal Investigation.

There are two possible takes on this:

• Case closed. They’ve got video evidence that puts him at the scene, links to the gun used, motive, and an admission by his wife. It’ll take a bit of tidying up, but they’ve finally solved it
• A suspect who is dead? Still not found the gun? A dodgy video of someone who might be him at the scene? Very convenient fall guy.

In a normal country, you’d expect things to clarify as all the evidence gets digested and explained – and for one of these positions to become the norm. However, in Taiwan, where people don’t let evidence cloud their judgement too much you can bet that those who always thought it was a fake will continue to believe that, and vice versa.

I suspect that the bit which will excite the Taiwanese media will be this bit:

Hou said that the suspect’s wife confessed to her that he shot the president. Hou told reporters the woman said her husband was quiet for several days after the shooting. After she saw the TV footage of her husband at the scene, she asked him if he did it, Hou said.

“He said, ‘I did it and I will handle it myself,”‘ Hou said quoting the suspect’s wife.

There’s nothing a Taiwanese reporter likes more than harassing a weeping wife/mother. I think she’s about to be very famous here – whether she likes it or not.

Vincent Siew, one of few the good guys in Taiwanese politics, has resigned his post as a vice-chairman of the KMT. Although it is not unexpected (he has taken a lower and lower profile in the last year or so, and threatened or tried to resign before), the timing is interesting. Resigning with immediate effect is a sign that he wants to avoid getting involved in the impending battle between Ma & Wang for control of the KMT.

Siew’s main claim to fame is as the premier of Taiwan from 1997 to 2000 – when he ran (unsucessfully) for Vice President with Lien Chan. His promotion to premier by (then President) Lee Deng Hui was one of the reasons that James Soong split from the KMT to form the PFP.
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Yesterday, the president met with James Soong, the head of the People First Party – and released a 10-point agreement document.

I can’t think of a more unlikely partnership than between Chen Shui-bian and James Soong. Back in March last year, it was generally thought that the PFP were the main people behind all the demonstrations protesting the presidential election; you’d have thought all the ranting by Soong about being robbed and ‘storming the presidential palace’ would have bought him an enemy for life in Chen (not to mention Soong’s previous history as head of the GIO).

However, once the DPP failed to get a majority in the legislature last December (with or without the help of the TSU), it became clear that Chen’s options were:

• Spend the next 4 years in the same impasse as the previous 4 years – where the legislature blocks almost everything the president sends them.
• Cut a deal.

Party loyalty is strong in Taiwan, so the chances of getting a few disgruntled KMT legislators to jump ship were pretty minimal (although, who knows what might happen if the KMT leadership battle turns ugly?), which leaves the PFP as the only option. There had been rumours and plans for this meeting for a while – but most people were pretty sceptical that anything would come of it; from that perspective, the outcome today is a success.
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