Reaction to China’s proposed anti-secession law has been understandably strong in Taiwan. Although the law has not been officially concluded yet, and the texts of drafts are only just starting to appear, everyone knew well in advance the basic substance. After some waffle about Taiwan being an inseperable part of China, and how everyone wants things to resolved in an amicable manner, the meat of the law is here:

8. If Taiwan splittist forces, under any pretense, using any method, cause the actuality of Taiwan splitting out of China, or if a major incident that will lead to Taiwan splitting out of China happens, or if the conditions for peaceful reunification are completely lost, the country should take non-peaceful methods and other necessary means and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

Of course, what is meant by the ‘actuality of Taiwan splitting out of China’ is open to interpretation: presumably the president of Taiwan saying that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state doesn’t count, but the Taiwanese government passing a law to that effect might. None the less the message is pretty clear.

Ignoring the more hardcore responses, like changing the constitution, or a referendum on independence (which wouldn’t have a chance of passing, even if they were sensible) – it’s worth looking at what the reaction in Taiwan is likely to be.

The most obvious response is a ‘tit-for-tat’ anti anti-secession law which would define Taiwans response to any ‘non-peaceful’ actions by China. Of course, this law would be even more of a symbolic jesture than China’s law: if it ever gets to that state, noone’s going to be worrying about the legality of it all. The subtext would be a restatement of the position that Taiwan is not controlled by the PRC, and so can pass whatever laws it likes too. However, the odds are that the different parties in the legislature will have trouble agreeing the substance and wording of any law, which could scupper that idea.

A more likely response is to reconsider the long-argued-over weapons purchases from the US. The legislature has been stuck for several months over a proposed budget of NT$610 billion (~US$20billion) for a special arms purchase package (with the KMT arguing for a reduced amount – despite the fact that they were the ones who originally brokered the deal); this law by China might just be the stimulus needed to get the package agreed upon.

However, the most likely response is more a question of what Taiwan won’t do. In the last couple of months, President Chen Shui Bian has shown an increased willingness to negotiate with the other side; he hasn’t actually changed his position, but his recent deal with the pro-unification PFP implies a softening of his stance. He has always wanted to restart talks with China, and it looked like he was maneuvering himself into a position which might make that possible. To do it, he would need the cooperation of the PFP, but also the support of his own party – which was already a bit shaky recently. The odds again him getting that support have just increased massively.

The fact that China have decided to pass this law now, when Taiwan have been making more concilliatory noises than at any time in the last ten years (which, granted, is not saying much), implies that China are not really too concerned about the lack of talks between the two sides.

(Thoughts about the anti-secession law can also be found at Naruwan Formosa)